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Abstract: In this paper I examine the debate 
between epistemic and descriptivist interpreters 
of Hume’s discussion of induction and probable 
reasoning. Epistemic interpreters view Hume as 
primarily concerned with questions relating to the 
epistemic authority and justification of our induc-
tive principles and beliefs. Descriptivist interpret-
ers, in contrast, suggest that Hume aims to explain 
how our inductive beliefs are produced, not to 
ascertain whether they are epistemically justified. 
I focus on three of these readings in particular: 
two of them epistemic, the third descriptivist. The 
first epistemic reading, presented by Peter Mil-
lican, portrays Hume as embracing scepticism 
about induction; the second epistemic reading, 
put forward by Louis Loeb, presents him as a 
non-sceptical externalist about justification; the 
descriptivist reading, defended by David Owen, 
presents Hume as engaged primarily in the scien-
tific task of describing the mechanisms by which 
we come to form our beliefs. 
In this paper, I propose an alternative to these 
sceptical, externalist and descriptivist interpreta-
tions. I argue that, although these readings pos-
sess undeniable strengths and although they are 
crucial in furthering our understanding of Hume’s 
thinking, they face problems that are potentially 
insurmountable. I conclude that the best strat-
egy open to us is to pursue a non-sceptical, non-
externalist epistemic account of Hume’s position. 
Part of my aim will be to question an assumption 
that is implicit in all three of these readings: the 
assumption that, for Hume, the concept of human 
nature is purely descriptive.
Resumen: En este artículo examino el debate 
entre los intérpretes epistémicos y descriptivis-
tas de la discusión humeana de la inducción y 
el razonamiento probable. Los intérpretes epis-
témicos consideran a Hume como concernido 
principalmente con cuestiones relacionadas con 
la autoridad y justificación epistémica de nues-
tros principios y creencias inductivas. Los intér-
pretes descriptivistas, por contra, sugieren que lo 
que Hume pretende es explicar cómo se producen 
nuestras creencias, no dictaminar si están episté-
micamente justificadas. En particular, me centro 
en tres de estas lecturas: dos de ellas epistémicas, 
la tercera descriptivista. La primera interpretación 
epistémica, la de Peter Millican, nos presenta a 
Hume abrazando un escepticismo respecto a 
la inducción; la segunda lectura epistémica, de 
Louis Loeb, lo presenta como un externalista no 
escéptico a propósito de la inducción; la lectura 
descriptivista, defendida por David Owen, pre-
senta a un Hume comprometido principalmente 
con la tarea científica de describir los mecanismos 
por los que llegamos a formar nuestras creencias. 
En este artículo propongo una interpretación 
alternativa a estas interpretaciones escépticas, 
externalistas y descriptivistas. Argumento que, 
aunque estas lecturas tienen innegables puntos de 
apoyo y ayudan crucialmente a mejorar nuestra 
comprensión del pensamiento de Hume, todas 
ellas enfrentan problemas potencialmente insupe-
rables. Concluyo que la mejor estrategia que nos 
queda abierta pasa por perseguir una explicación 
que no sea ni escéptica ni externalista de la posi-
ción de Hume. Parte de mi objetivo es cuestionar 
una asunción implícita en estas tres lecturas, a 
saber: que para Hume el concepto de naturaleza 
humana es puramente descriptivo.
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1. Introduction
The last few decades have brought extraordinary changes to the way in which we inter-
pret Hume’s writings on human understanding in the Treatise and the Enquiry. The debates 
that have emerged under the broad umbrella of the New Hume have been rich and extremely 
positive to Humean scholarship, so much so that there is now a consensus (highly unusual 
in philosophy!) as to the fact that some of the traditional approaches to Hume’s texts are, in 
effect, obsolete.1 In this paper, I focus on one of these recent debates: that between epistemic 
and descriptivist interpreters of Hume’s discussion of induction or probable reasoning.2 
Epistemic readings present Hume’s discussions of induction as turning primarily on issues 
of justification or warrant. According to these readings, Hume is concerned, first and fore-
most, with the question of whether or not some of our key principles or (depending on the 
context) our beliefs are justified or warranted. Epistemic readers have typically portrayed 
Hume as giving negative answers to such questions. In other words, they have presented 
Hume as embracing the sceptical view that the principles or beliefs under consideration are 
not, in fact, justified or warranted. I will call this line of interpretation the Sceptical epis-
temic reading.3 Recent years have also seen the emergence of an epistemic but non-sceptical 
reading of Hume’s treatment of induction, one that portrays him as embracing an externalist 
approach to justification. I will call this the Externalist reading.4 Descriptivist readings, in 
contrast, differ from epistemic ones (in their Sceptical and Externalist variants) in that they 
maintain that Hume is not primarily concerned with the issue of epistemic justification. 5 
Instead they see Hume as engaged, for the most part, in the development of a new cogni-
tive science, one whose aim is to explain the formation of our beliefs, to identify the causal 
mechanisms that produce them – not to establish whether they are justified.6 Hume’s aim, 
in the Descriptivist view, is not to establish whether or how our beliefs are justified, but to 
explain how they are caused. 
1 On this, see notably Beebee (2006) ch. 5 and Millican (2007) pp. 163-164.
2 Owen makes a persuasive point against the overuse of the term ‘induction’ in the context of Hume’s writings 
– see Owen (1999) p. 113 n. 1. Although I certainly take this point, I shall, for the sake of simplicity, continue 
using the term ‘induction’ in this paper, alongside the expression ‘probable reasoning’. This term ‘induction’ is 
used by other participants on both sides of the debate – see, for instance, Millican (2007) p. 164, Garrett (1997) 
p. 76 and Loeb (2006) p. 321. 
3 Sceptical readings are advanced by Flew, Stroud and, in a modified form, by Millican; See Flew (1961), Stroud 
(1977), Millican (1995), Millican (1998), Millican (2000), Millican (2001), Millican (2002), Millican (2007). I 
am borrowing the labels ‘sceptical’ and ‘descriptivist’ from Loeb – Loeb (2006) pp. 322 & 324.
4 Externalist accounts are defended by Loeb and Schmitt, amongst others. See Loeb (2002), Loeb (2006), Schmitt 
(1992) and Schmitt (2004).
5 Descriptivist interpreters include Garrett, Owen and Noonan – see Garrett (1997), Garrett (2002), Owen (1999) 
and Noonan (1999). 
6 I am using the expression ‘causal mechanisms’ in a broad sense that is compatible with both Owen and Garrett’s 
accounts. Cf. Garrett (1997) p. 92 and Owen (1999) pp. 132-133. 
Palabras clave: Hume. Inducción. Razonamiento 
probable. Escepticismo. Externalismo. Descrip-
tivismo. Naturaleza. Millican. Loeb. Owen.
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In this paper, I propose an alternative to the Sceptical, Externalist and Descriptivist lines 
of interpretation. I argue that, although these readings possess undeniable strengths and 
although they have been crucial in furthering our understanding of Hume’s thinking, they 
face problems that are potentially insurmountable – problems that are likely to render them, 
ultimately, unviable. One of my aims is to show that these readings share an implicit assump-
tion: the assumption that, for Hume, the concept of human nature is essentially descriptive. 
In my view, challenging this assumption opens the way for a different interpretative line, 
one that is free from the difficulties encountered by these three readings. 
In sections 2, 3 and 4, I critically examine the Sceptical, Descriptivist and Externalist 
interpretations as they emerge in the works of, respectively, Peter Millican, David Owen 
and Louis Loeb. I conclude that the best strategy open to us is to pursue a non-sceptical, 
non-externalist epistemic account of Hume’s position. In section 5, I present an alternative 
interpretative approach, one that does not play on the externalist – internalist distinction, but 
that may lead us a different understanding of Hume’s conception of human nature. 
 
2. The Sceptical Epistemic Reading
Hume’s discussion of induction in Treatise I.iii.6 and Enquiry IV is notoriously difficult. 
One fundamental question to arise from these passages is this: is Hume concerned with 
the epistemic justification of our inductive principles or beliefs or is he first and foremost 
interested in describing the causal mechanisms that produce these beliefs – regardless of 
their justification? In this section, I examine how the Sceptical reading attempts to address 
this question and the problems it faces in so doing.
Peter Millican, in a series of carefully crafted, thought-provoking texts, has developed 
a modified version of the Sceptical epistemic reading of Hume’s position on induction. In 
his view, Hume is primarily concerned with investigating the rational grounds – that is, the 
justification – for the Uniformity Principle. Millican describes the Uniformity Principle as 
the principle that ‘the behaviour of things we have observed is positively evidentially relevant 
to the behaviour of things we have not observed’ (Millican 2007, p. 194). The Uniformity 
Principle is central here in that it forms the basis for all inductive inferences. More spe-
cifically, the transitivity of rational justification means that, if this principle lacks rational 
grounds, the entire edifice of inductive inference will lack such grounds too. According to 
Millican, Hume’s discussion shows that no rational grounds can be found for this principle 
and therefore that inductive inferences are not justified. The notion of ‘rational grounds’ at 
work in this reading is comparatively broad: when Hume concludes that there are no rational 
grounds for the Uniformity Principle, he is excluding not only demonstrative inferences 
(understood in a wide sense of the phrase as informal – rather than formal – deductions, that 
is, as arguments in which the premise or premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion), 7 but 
also all sensory and intuitive evidence. This is important since, for Millican, one of Hume’s 
principal targets is Locke’s account of probable reasoning (or reasoning based on rational 
perception).8 This broad understanding of Hume’s notion of rational grounds renders Hume’s 
7 Cf. Flew (1961). Millican discusses Flew’s account in Millican (2000) p. 166.
8 See Millican (2000) and Millican (2007) pp. 176-186 and 194-195
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sceptical conclusion all the more devastating in its scope. For Hume’s negative conclusion 
is that there can be no rational grounds whatsoever – and therefore, in this account, no jus-
tification whatsoever – for the Uniformity Principle.9 Millican writes:
[the Uniformity Principle] has no possible basis in reason, because it is not intuitively 
evident, cannot be established on the basis of what we perceive, cannot be inferred 
deductively from anything that we have experienced, and cannot be inferred induc-
tively without begging the question. (Italics added. Millican 2007, p. 166.)
Having established that there can be no rational grounds for the Uniformity Principle, 
Hume goes on to explain why this principle nevertheless features so centrally in our think-
ing. Millican suggests that the principle
is entirely non-rational, and is the product not of reason but merely of a certain brute 
‘natural instinct, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is 
able either to produce or to prevent’ (Enquiry, pp. 46-47). This instinct is what ‘makes 
us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared 
in the past’ (Enquiry p. 44), and Hume calls it ‘custom’ or ‘habit’. (Millican 2000, 
p. 189)
In this view, therefore, Hume’s notion of ‘custom’ emerges at the heart of what he regards 
as the sceptical solution to his sceptical problem: although there are absolutely no rational 
grounds for those beliefs produced on the basis of inductive inferences, we continue forming 
these beliefs because it is psychologically impossible for us not to do so. 
The instinctive mechanism of custom, though not in any way supplying the rational 
perception that Locke has taken for granted as a requirement for rational belief, steps 
into the breach and leaves us psychologically unable to refrain from forming beliefs 
about the unobserved. (Millican 2007, p. 195)
Millican’s reading of Hume’s discussion of induction has much to recommend it.10 Nev-
ertheless, there is a fundamental difficulty with this line of interpretation, to wit: Hume’s 
repeated defence of empirical, inductive science (that is, of science based on experience) 
over other forms of belief-forming processes. Millican himself admits this difficulty when 
he writes:
On induction, for example, there really is a problem about reconciling a sceptical 
interpretation […] with the positive view of inductive science he takes elsewhere. 
(Millican 2007, p. 164)
9 Millican argues, similarly, that, for Hume, ‘our belief in the external world [is] rationally indefensible’ – see 
Millican (2002) pp. 44-45.
10 In particular, Millican’s broad notion of what counts as rational grounds for Hume and his account of the scope 
of Hume’s negative argument are both highly persuasive. For a defence of these over Owen’s narrower view of 
Hume’s target, see Millican (2007) pp. 181-186.
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Millican attempts to address this difficulty by suggesting that Hume’s favouring of 
inductive science may be explained on pragmatic grounds. Crucially, since custom makes 
it psychologically impossible for us not to form certain beliefs about the unobserved, we 
might as well embrace a system of enquiry in which experience is carefully weighed and 
taken into account. Millican writes:
Having identified custom as the ‘sceptical solution’ to his ‘sceptical doubts’, Hume’s 
procedure is to follow through its demands systematically. If we cannot help making 
judgements and forming beliefs on the basis of conformity with our past experience, 
then we can at least be discriminating in applying this standard. We can also dismiss 
aprioristic metaphysics, since only experience can receive custom’s endorsement. 
(Millican 2007, p. 195)
This, Millican suggests, lies at the heart of Hume’s vindication of empirical science 
over superstition: we may or may not find this defence of empirical science persuasive, but 
it remains the case that Hume’s endorsement of empirical science is fuelled by pragmatic 
considerations of this type.11
This is an interesting attempt to block what is perhaps the most important line of objec-
tion against the Sceptical reading and Millican’s version of this reading is all the more 
effective for it. Nevertheless, it remains unclear to what extent this approach can genuinely 
succeed. Part of the problem here has to do with the use Hume makes of inductive inferences 
in the writing of both the Treatise and the Enquiry. As Don Garrett observes:
Hume himself makes inductive inferences constantly – before, during and after the 
famous argument of Treatise I.iii.6. (Garrett 1997, p. 78)
A similar consideration leads Annette Baier to conclude:
If Hume really distrusts causal inference, then he must distrust his own Treatise. 
(Baier, 1991, p. 55)
It is not merely the number of inductive inferences that feature in Hume’s arguments, 
but the sheer ease with which Hume appears to make use of them at times, as if there was 
nothing much problematic about such inferences after all.12 The number of passages that 
illustrate this point abound – from the setting up of the Copy Principle at the beginning of 
the Treatise, through his discussion of belief in Treatise I.iii.8, to his discussion of Miracles 
in the first Enquiry X.13 This, to my mind, remains a persisting problem for the Sceptical 
reading.
11 Millican writes: ‘Whether all this can succeed as a way of vindicating empirical science over superstition can, 
of course, be debated. But I think it is very clear that Hume himself was committed to something like this strat-
egy.’ – Millican (2007) p. 195.
12 This is not to deny that Hume experiences genuine moments of sceptical despair. On this, see Sanfélix ???
13 On this, see Loeb (2006) p. 323. Perhaps it could be replied that it is not surprising to find Hume making use of 
inductive inferences in this way: after all, Millican acknowledges that, for Hume, the human mind finds such 
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3. Non-Epistemic Descriptivism
It is considerations such as these that have in part fuelled the Descriptivist reading of 
Hume’s discussion of induction, an important version of which is put forward by David 
Owen.14 In Owen’s view, Hume is not interested in the question of justification as it is cur-
rently understood in philosophy. He writes:
It is tempting to read into Hume a more current problem: given that we have such 
beliefs, how, if at all, are they justified? Hume’s problem is more one of explanation 
than justification: given that we have such beliefs, what is their nature and how is it 
that we come to have them?’ (Owen, 1999, p. 118)
According to Owen, Hume’s discussion of induction (or, more accurately for Owen, 
of probable reasoning15) in the Treatise is best understood as aiming to describe the causal 
mechanisms that lead the mind to move from certain impressions to certain beliefs (or ideas) 
about the unobserved. Central here is the view that
probable reasoning, in its most basic form, allows for inferences from one idea to 
another to be explained without the recourse of the intermediate ideas which are 
required by reason. (Owen, 1999, p. 131) 
The conception of reason at work in this reading is very different from Millican’s. For 
Owen, Hume’s discussion aims to undermine one particular conception of probable reason-
ing, namely reasoning understood as requiring ‘the discovery and use of intermediate ideas’ 
in the explanation of the transition from impressions to beliefs (Owen, 1999, p. 132).16 
Hume’s view is that our beliefs in the unobserved arise from causal processes that do not 
always feature intermediate ideas acting as links between impressions and ideas. Hence, in 
the most basic cases of probable reasoning
a person reasons without reflecting on past experience and without recourse to the 
uniformity principle […so that] The transition, the movement of the mind from the 
impression to the idea, is not an activity of the faculty of reason, conceived of as the 
inferences psychologically impossible to resist. If, at times, Hume gives the impression that inductive infer-
ences are non-problematic, it may be because he is, in those passages, simply bowing to their inevitability: since 
we are incapable of avoiding them, Hume might as well treat them as non-problematic, at least at certain key 
junctures in his argument. This is, after all, part and parcel of the pragmatic strategy described above. A serious 
problem remains, however. For Hume does not limit himself to treating some of the inductive inferences he 
makes as non-problematic: there is, as we will see in section 3, compelling evidence to suggest that he in fact 
regards them as epistemically successful.
14 Owen (1999). Another prominent version of the Descriptivist reading is presented in Garrett (1997).
15 See my footnote 2 above.
16 Owen argues that beliefs are a subcategory of ideas for Hume. For his compelling discussion of this issue, see 
Owen (1999) pp. 117 – 119.
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discovery and use of intermediate ideas which explain the transition. (Owen, 1999, 
pp. 131-132)17
Owen acknowledges that there are significant normative elements to both the Treatise 
and the Enquiry. At the same time, he maintains that the normative questions that emerge 
in these texts are very different from the Russellian style of concern over the justification of 
induction that the Sceptical reading attributes to Hume.18 Owen notes:
I am not denying that there is a problem of induction that is largely concerned with 
justification. I am claiming only that it is not Hume’s position. (Owen, 1999, p. 139)
According to Owen, two important normative questions arise in the Treatise: the first 
relates to the normative criteria that govern correct and incorrect uses of reason; the second 
relates to Hume’s preference for certain forms of probable reasoning over other belief-form-
ing devices (namely, over those devices he regards as fostering superstition and prejudice). 
Owen draws the distinction between these two normative questions in the following passage:
Hume can present a theory of reason, both demonstrative and probable, with a 
criterion of right and wrong ways of using reason, without answering the question 
whether the beliefs reached by the correct use of reason are justified. We might have 
a normative criterion for the correct use of reason but wonder whether reason itself 
is something we should prefer over the alternatives. Consider […] Roman augury 
by the inspection of a sacrificed sheep’s entrails. There is clearly a right and wrong 
way of performing such actions, and the practice is clearly normative; priests devoted 
lifetimes to developing their skills. But we might still wonder whether the practice 
was warranted. (Owen, 1999, p. 206.)
Owen suggests that the first question – the question concerning the normative criteria that 
govern correct and incorrect uses of reason – emerges in Treatise I.iii.15; the second – the 
question of why certain forms of probable reasoning should be preferred over other belief 
forming mechanisms – is posed in Book IV of the Treatise but only genuinely addressed in 
the first Enquiry.19 
There is no doubt that there is textual evidence, certainly in the Treatise, in favour of the 
Descriptivist account.20 Indeed, Owen’s interpretation contains some valuable insights into 
17 Owen illustrates this point by referring us to Hume’s footnote in Treatise I, iii, VII, pp. 96-97: ‘we may exert 
our reason without employing more than two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to serve as a medium 
between them’.
18 Owen (1999) p. 206. On this, see also Garrett (1997) pp. 230-233
19 Owen (1999) p. 206. Owen makes an intriguing proposal on the latter: he argues that, for Hume, reason (when it 
is used appropriately, as in the mitigated form of scepticism or in ‘true philosophy’) is to be preferred over other 
belief-forming processes in that we find it pleasing – that is, because we feel a sentiment of moral approval 
towards it. Although I will not be discussing this here, there are, in my view, some serious problems with this 
proposal. We will be returning to the question of the superiority of certain forms of probable reasoning over 
other belief forming processes in sections 4 and 5 of this paper.
20 See for example Owen (1999) p. 138.
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Hume’s thinking, notably, for instance, into his distinction between reflexive and reflective 
probable reasoning.21 (We will be returning to this in sections 4 and 5.) Nevertheless, the 
Descriptivist reading also presents what I see as some genuinely intractable difficulties.22 In 
what follows, I would like briefly to discuss what is, in my view, the most pressing problem 
with the reading. The problem, discussed in a highly persuasive manner by Louis Loeb, is 
this:23 there are many passages in Hume’s writings that portray individual instances of induc-
tive inferences as positively epistemically successful. In other words, Hume often writes as 
if he regards certain inductive inferences and the beliefs they give rise to as epistemically 
justified. This issue has received much attention elsewhere, so I will limit myself to citing 
some of the most relevant passages here:24 
The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate 
impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because 
‘tis the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another. 
(Italics added. Treatise I.iii.6 pp. 89-90)
One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in 
the dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho’ that conclusion be derived from nothing 
but custom. (Italics added. Treatise I.iv.4 p. 225)
No matter of fact can be proved but from its cause and effect. Nothing can be known 
to be the cause of another but by experience. (Italics added. Abstract, Treatise p. 654) 
There have, of course, been Descriptivist attempts at blocking this objection. There 
has, for instance, been an important discussion in the literature as to how we should inter-
pret terms such as ‘just’, ‘prove’ and ‘knowledge’ in this context. In my view, however, 
this Descriptivist strategy is not successful in the final analysis. 25 This, as well as other 
considerations,26 arbitrates against the Descriptivist approach and in favour of the view that 
Hume is, after all, engaged with questions relating to the justification of inductive inferences 
and inductive beliefs in Treatise I.iii.6. If this is correct, and I believe it is, we have reached 
what on the face of it may appear to be something of a paradox: on the one hand, Hume 
suggests that inductive inferences are not justified on rational grounds; on the other hand, 
he suggests that they are epistemically justified. The apparent paradox dissolves, however, 
as soon as we abandon the idea that, for Hume, only reason can possibly provide epistemic 
justification. This, of course, is the starting point of the Externalist reading. 
21 Owen (1999) ch. 9 and pp. 170-172 respectively.
22 See Millican (2007) pp. 181-186 and Loeb (2006) pp. 324-330.
23 See Loeb (2006) pp. 323-324 and 326-327 and Loeb (2008), especially the section entitled ‘Evidence that 
Hume Considers Inductive Inference Justified’.
24 On this, see notably Loeb (2008), especially the section entitled ‘Evidence that Hume Considers Inductive 
Inference Justified’ and Loeb (2002) pp. 43-44, nn. 12-13, 47 n. 19, 102 nn. 2-3. 
25 See Loeb (2002) pp. 43-44, nn. 12-13, 47 n. 19, 102 nn. 2-3.
26 For instance, the Descriptivist reading also faces some serious problems arising from the structure of Hume’s 
discussion of induction. See Millican (2007) pp. 181 – 186.
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4. The Externalist Epistemic Reading
The Externalist interpretation developed by Louis Loeb suggests that Hume rejects the 
idea that inductive inference is justified on rational grounds but endorses the idea that it is 
justified on other, non-rational, externalist grounds. Rationality is here to be understood as 
involving the advancement of any type of good argument. Loeb argues that reading Hume 
as advancing an epistemic view only forces us to adopt the Sceptical reading if we assume 
that ‘justification must derive from «reason», from the availability of a cogent argument’ 
(Loeb, 2006, p. 322). Loeb therefore rejects the idea that, for Hume,
a belief is justified only if it is supported or supportable by good argument. Roughly 
speaking, this is an internalist assumption. According to epistemic internalism, the 
justification of a belief depends exclusively upon the beliefs one holds or—in ver-
sions that tolerate parasitism—upon beliefs that are available, beliefs one could hold. 
(Loeb, 2006, p. 333.)
 
Loeb discusses a range of possible externalist epistemic criteria including stability, reli-
ability and irresistibility. He himself favours the former: a belief is epistemically justified 
when it is a ‘steady belief’, that is, when it the stable product of custom. 27 
Although I am sympathetic to many aspects of this account – notably, its central claim 
that justification need not be based on good argument for Hume – there are, I feel, some 
grounds for concern here. In the remainder of this section, I will consider two potential pit-
falls for this reading. The first relates to the plausibility of rendering the externalist criteria 
for justification consistent with the variety of passages in which Hume discusses epistemic 
success and failure. Consider, for instance, the following passage in connection with the 
stability criterion:
The devotees of that strange superstition [i.e. ‘the Roman Catholic religion’] usually 
plead in excuse of the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that they feel 
the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and actions, in enlivening 
their devotion, and quickening their fervour […] We shadow out the objects of our 
faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by 
the immediate presence of these types, than ‘tis possible for us to do, merely by an 
intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have always a greater influence 
on the fancy than any other; and this influence they readily convey to those ideas, to 
which they are related, and which they Resemble. (Treatise I.iii.8)
27 Loeb argues for the stability criterion in Loeb (2000); the criterion is then revised in Loeb (2004). Other exter-
nalist criteria are discussed in Loeb (2004) and Loeb (2006). Although Loeb favours the stability criterion, he 
appears open to the possibility of other externalist criteria playing a part in our exegetical strategies. He writes: 
‘Adjudicating among [the various externalist criteria] – better yet, understanding how the texts and Hume’s 
historical position constrain the choices among them – is the central challenge in coming to terms with Hume’s 
epistemic position’ – Loeb (2006) p. 334.
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This passage indicates that being presented with the sensible images of ‘the objects of 
[their] faith’ can help, through the effects of custom, to enliven the ideas of Catholic practi-
tioners and thus to foster the stability of their beliefs. At the same time Hume’s mention of 
‘superstition’ clearly shows that he does not regard these beliefs to be epistemically justified. 
This would suggest that not all custom based mechanisms that foster stability are the kinds 
of mechanisms that also convey epistemic authority. 28 
Consider also Hume’s discussion of Education in the following passage:
But can we doubt of this agreement in their influence on the judgment, when we 
consider the nature and effects Of EDUCATION?
All those opinions and notions of things, to which we have been accustomed from our 
infancy, take such deep root, that ‘tis impossible for us, by all the powers of reason 
and experience, to eradicate them; and this habit not only approaches in its influence, 
but even on many occasions prevails over that which a-rises from the constant and 
inseparable union of causes and effects. Here we must not be contented with saying, 
that the vividness of the idea produces the belief: We must maintain that they are 
individually the same. The frequent repetition of any idea infixes it in the imagination; 
but cou’d never possibly of itself produce belief, if that act of the mind was, by the 
original constitution of our natures, annex’d only to a reasoning and comparison of 
ideas. Custom may lead us into some false comparison of ideas. […]
If we consider this argument from education in a proper light, ‘twill appear very con-
vincing; and the more so, that ‘tis founded on one of the most common phaenomena, 
that is any where to be met with. I am persuaded, that upon examination we shall find 
more than one half of those opinions, that prevail among mankind, to be owing to 
education, and that the principles, which are thus implicitely embrac’d, overballance 
those, which are owing either to abstract reasoning or experience. As liars, by the 
frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to remember them; so the judgment, or 
rather the imagination, by the like means, may have ideas so strongly imprinted on it, 
and conceive them in so full a light, that they may operate upon the mind in the same 
manner with those, which the senses, memory or reason present to us. (Treatise I.iii.9)
Hume suggests here that ‘education’ (understood primarily as a kind of indoctrination or 
brainwashing) is capable of producing beliefs that are so resistant to change – so stable in 
that respect – that it becomes ‘impossible for us, by all the powers of reason and experience, 
to eradicate them’. The fact that these beliefs display such stability, however, does not qualify 
them for epistemic approval, hence the comparison with the case of liars. It would seem from 
passages such as this that steadiness does not guarantee epistemic justification for Hume.29 
28 Loeb notes, quite rightly, that his view is not that all custom based mechanisms are conveyors of epistemic 
authority in Hume’s view – Loeb (2006) p. 334. However, my objection here is that not all custom based mecha-
nisms that foster stability may be. For an interesting and generous discussion of the problems with the stability 
criterion and with other externalists criteria, see Loeb (2004).
29 Loeb attempts to block this objection from Hume’s discussion of education in Loeb (2004) pp. 357 & 393, but 
I do not find his attempt convincing. In my view, the lack of fit between the externalist criteria and the various 
passages in which Hume discusses epistemic authority suggests that there is something fundamentally distort-
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The second potential pitfall for the Externalist reading arises from Hume’s stated prefer-
ence for certain forms of probable reasoning over other forms of belief-forming processes. 
In order to clarify this point, it is useful to introduce Hume’s distinction between reflexive 
and reflective probable reasoning. Owen describes this distinction in the following way: 
Our probable reasonings come in various forms: at the simple and most basic level, 
such ‘reasonings’ are really just reflexive responses, conditioned by past stimuli, to 
current perceptions. At the other extreme, there are complex, reflective reasonings, 
involving conscious consideration of a variety of previous experiences, including 
experiences of our own instances of reasoning. (Owen, 1999, p. 149)
As an example of reflexive probable reasoning, Owen refers to Hume’s discussion of the 
person who stops walking when confronted with a river in Treatise I.iii.8. Hume explains 
that, in such cases: 
The idea of sinking is so closely connected with that of water, and the idea of suffo-
cating with that of sinking, that the mind makes the transition without the assistance 
of the memory. The custom operates before we have time for reflection. (Treatise 
I.iii.8, p. 104)
Cases of reflexive probable reasoning are, therefore, cases in which custom and experi-
ence operate ‘expressly and directly, via an unconscious association of ideas’ (Owen, 1999, 
p. 171). 
The notion of reflective probable reasoning, in turn, is illustrated by the following exam-
ple of reasoning on the basis of only one experiment, also in Treatise I.iii.8. Hume writes:
In general we may observe, that in all the most established and uniform conjunctions 
of causes and effects, such as those of gravity, impulse, solidity, &c. the mind never 
carries its view expressly to consider any past experience: Tho’ in other associations 
of objects, which are more rare and unusual, it may assist the custom and transition 
of ideas by this reflection. Nay we find in some cases, that the reflection produces 
the belief without the custom; or more properly speaking, that the reflection produces 
the custom in an oblique and artificial manner. I explain myself. ’Tis certain, that 
not only in philosophy, but even in common life, we may attain the knowledge of a 
particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and 
after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances. Now as after 
ing about approaching Hume’s texts through the goggles of the internalist-externalist dichotomy. We will con-
sider this issue in section 5. 
 Loeb might argue that the examples of education and of Catholic practice do not count against his view because 
they illustrate artificial, rather than natural, belief forming processes. He certainly puts the emphasis on the 
relevance of naturalistic considerations to the Externalist in remarks such as the following: ‘according to [exter-
nalist] theories, the epistemic status of a belief depends, at least in part, upon naturalistic facts about the mecha-
nism that produces it’ (Loeb, 2006, p. 334). In my view, however, there is a serious question mark over the 
view of ‘nature’ and the ‘natural’ that is implicit in this claim – and, indeed, that is implicit in the Sceptical and 
Descriptivist readings. We will be touch upon this question in section 5.
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one experiment of this kind, the mind, upon the appearance either of the cause or the 
effect, can draw an inference concerning the existence of its correlative; and as a habit 
can never be acquir’d merely by one instance; it may be thought, that belief cannot in 
this case be esteem’d the effect of custom. But this difficulty will vanish, if we con-
sider, that tho’ we are here suppos’d to have had only one experiment of a particular 
effect, yet we have many millions to convince us of this principle; that like objects 
placed in like circumstances, will always produce like effects; and as this principle 
has established itself by a sufficient custom, it bestows an evidence and firmness on 
any opinion, to which it can be apply’d. The connexion of the ideas is not habitual 
after one experiment: but this connexion is comprehended under another principle, 
that is habitual; which brings us back to our hypothesis. In all cases we transfer our 
experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either expressly or tacitly, 
either directly or indirectly. (Treatise I.iii.8, pp. 104-105). 
It is important to note that custom is central to both reflective and reflexive probable 
reasoning: in reflective reasoning, it operates ‘tacitly’ or ‘indirectly’ through a conscious 
consideration of the Uniformity Principle; in reflexive reasoning it operates ‘expressly and 
directly’ through the unconscious associative mechanism.30
It seems clear that successful reflective reasoning is the type of probable reasoning that 
involves paying conscious attention to good argument. At the same time, reflective probable 
reasoning, when it is used appropriately, is precisely the type of reasoning that character-
ises ‘true philosophy’ and that is therefore favoured by Hume for its capacity to safeguard 
us against prejudice and superstition. In my view, Hume’s strong preference for this type 
of probable reasoning does not sit happily with the Externalist agenda. This is the second, 
and perhaps most important, problem with the Externalist reading. Let us take a moment 
to consider it. 
The idea that reflective probable reasoning differs from and is superior to reflexive prob-
able reasoning (in the sense of being the purview of the wise, rather than the vulgar) emerges 
in passages such as the following:31
Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an 
object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the 
imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, Tho’ the 
object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that 
cause. Here is the first influence of general rules. But when we take a review of this 
act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of 
the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the 
most established principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. This 
is a second influence of general rules, and implies the condemnation of the former. 
30 This point is defended to great effect by Owen in Owen (1999) p. 171
31 Loeb attempts to block this line of objection by portraying Hume as mostly critical of reflective probable 
reasoning. To my mind, however, passages such as the following show that this is not a convincing strategy. 
For Loeb’s take on Hume’s attitude towards reflective reasoning see Loeb (2002) pp. 84-87. For a persuasive 
defence of the view that reflective probable reasoning is favoured by Hume, see Owen (1999) pp. 209-214.
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Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and 
character of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men 
by the second. (Treatise I.iii.13, ‘Of Unphilosophical Probability’).
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions 
as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree 
of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence 
of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution: he weighs the opposite 
experiments: he considers which side is supported by the greater number of experi-
ments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes 
his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All prob-
ability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one 
side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, propor-
tioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty 
on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform 
experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong 
degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where 
they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know 
the exact force of the superior evidence. (EHU X, p. 110)
Earlier, I was careful to point out that Hume favours ‘reflective probable reasoning, when 
it is used appropriately’.32 According to Hume, reflective probable reasoning can either 
be used appropriately, in which case it enriches our understanding, or inappropriately, in 
which case it fizzles out or ends up defeating itself. It is used appropriately when it takes 
as its starting point the principles that custom (that is instinct or sentiment) furnishes us 
with – such as the Principle of Uniformity.33 It is used inappropriately, when it attempts to 
go beyond custom – as it were – and tries to manufacture its own foundations, as in exces-
sive scepticism or Phyrronism (Treatise I.iv and first Enquiry XII). This idea is elegantly 
summarised in the following passages from the otherwise deeply melancholic conclusion 
to Book I of the Treatise:
I have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its 
most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of 
evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. (Treatise, I. iv.7, 
p. 267.)
Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity [here, some inclination 
or sentiment], it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title 
to operate upon us. (Treatise, I. iv.7, p. 270.)
32 I am indebted for much of what is to follow to having had a preview of Vincente Sanfélix’s paper entitled ‘El 
escepticismo humeano a propósito del mundo externo’, also published in this volume. That paper – Sanfélix 
(???) – together with Sanfélix (1994) have played an important inspirational role in the development of my 
views. I am also indebted to Owen’s discussion of the warrant of reason in Owen (1999) especially pp. 205-223. 
33 And, possibly, the assumptions of the vulgar in Hume’s discussion of the external world – see Sanfélix (???) 
secs. 4 & 5.
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Hume thus concludes:
And in this respect I make bold to recommend [true] philosophy, and shall not scruple 
to give it the preference to superstition of every kind or denomination. (Treatise, I. 
iv.7, p. 271.)
Advocates of the Externalist reading might reply that this is in fact perfectly compatible 
with their view: reflective probable reasoning is only justified when it is based on custom 
and satisfies the externalist criteria.34 Nevertheless, the fact that, for Hume, the superior form 
of probable reasoning is precisely the one that requires conscious attention to good argument 
does not sit happily with the externalist proposal, in my view. That there is a concern about 
this, within the Externalist camp, emerges in Loeb’s negative portrayal of the reflective 
person – a portrayal I find unconvincing, in light of the textual evidence.35 
5. Towards a new epistemic interpretation
We are now in a position to draw a series of important conclusions concerning Hume’s 
discussion of inductive inference – conclusions that open the way, in my view, for a new 
reading, one that differs from the Sceptical, Descriptivist and Externalist accounts. The first 
conclusion I draw from our previous discussion is that there are certainly grounds for view-
ing Hume as concerned, at least in great part, with the question of the epistemic justification 
of our inductive beliefs. The second is that Hume should nevertheless not be regarded as a 
sceptic about induction, if ‘scepticism’ is here taken to be the view that our inductive beliefs 
are not justified. Hume certainly contends that the principle that forms the basis for our 
reflective inductive reasonings (the Uniformity Principle) is not justified on rational grounds; 
but he also regards this principle as epistemically justified on the instinctive, non-rational 
grounds of custom and sentiment. As such, it can play a fundamental normative role in our 
reflective probable reasoning. Custom and sentiment also provide, via a more direct route, 
the justification for those beliefs that are formed through reflexive – rather than reflective 
– probable reasoning. One of Hume’s central messages is therefore that reason is not the 
only possible source of justification. In this respect, the Externalist reading is, I contend, 
absolutely correct. 
The Externalist reading faces some significant challenges in other areas, however. The 
first challenge is that of ensuring that whatever externalist criterion is proposed really does 
cohere with the wide range of passages in which Hume discusses cases of epistemic suc-
cess and failure. The second challenge facing the Externalist reading comes from Hume’s 
preference for reflective probable reasoning as a belief-forming device – a preference that 
sits very uncomfortably, in my view, alongside epistemic externalism. These difficulties 
throw serious question marks over the extent to which the Externalist reading is faithful to 
Hume’s intentions.
34 Indeed, see Loeb (2002) pp. 105-111.
35 Loeb (2002) pp. 79-100.
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How then are we to understand Hume’s views on the justification of inductive infer-
ence? I would suggest that, if we are to try and place Hume’s position within the spectrum 
of contemporary epistemic approaches  (and I am not certain that this really is a worthwhile 
exegetical strategy), we might do better to locate it within the contextualist, rather than the 
externalist, camp. What I mean by this is that we might do better to view Hume as arguing 
for some restricted form of subject-contextualism, where the epistemic standard is deter-
mined by the nature of the subject of belief. Thus, it might be appropriate to regard Hume as 
arguing that, whilst reflexive standards of justification befit non-human animals, infants and 
(perhaps) the vulgar, other human beings should aspire to the higher standards of reflective 
probable reasoning  – the standards of wise folk and true philosophers, those that involve 
mitigated, rather than excessive, scepticism.36 
This helps to highlight another weakness of the Externalist reading. For the Externalist 
reading presents Hume’s approach to the structure of epistemic justification as essentially 
outcome-dependent. What I mean by this is that, according to these readings, a belief-form-
ing mechanism conveys epistemic authority in so far as it succeeds in delivering certain out-
comes – that is, in so far as it produces beliefs that are stable, or irresistible, or reliable, etc.37 
If the parallel with contextualism is correct, however, Hume’s thinking about the structure of 
justification is more procedural than outcome-dependent. That is to say, in Hume’s view, a 
belief is justified if it is formed according to the appropriate procedure (the appropriate belief 
formation process); and what counts as the appropriate procedure depends on the standards 
that befit the nature of the subject of belief. Although outcome-dependent considerations 
may well be important for Hume, they are, I would argue, secondary – not primary, as the 
Externalist reading suggests. Procedural considerations, understood in this limited way, are 
conceptually prior to outcome-dependent ones for Hume. The idea that outcome-depedent 
considerations are secondary emerges in passages such as the following, amongst others:
One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than 
in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is 
certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we 
may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience 
(EHU X, p. 110)
One intriguing aspect of the reading I propose here is that it puts Hume’s concept of 
human nature in a new light. The Sceptical, Descriptivist and Externalist readings have in 
common the assumption that human nature is, for Hume, a purely descriptive, non-normative 
notion – human nature, in their view, is essentially a collection of brute facts.38 Custom, 
being a natural mechanism, is itself a brute fact: Sceptical and Descriptivist readers take this 
as evidence for the view that custom cannot therefore play a normative role, that it cannot 
supply an adequate notion of justification; Externalist readers, in turn, suggest that custom 
plays a normative role but only in so far as it is capable of delivering certain normatively 
36 On this see notably Treatise I.iii. 16 (‘Of the reason of animals).
37 The only Externalist criterion that might not fit this description, of the ones discussed by Loeb, is the ‘proper 
function’ criterion – Loeb (2006) p. 334. But there are other important problems with this criterion.
38 See, for instance, Millican (2000) p. 189, Owen (1999) p. 118 and Loeb (2006) p. 334.
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desirable qualities of belief (such as stability, or irresistibility, or reliability). Further reflec-
tion may show, however, that Hume’s concept of human nature is far more hybrid than this, 
that it consists of both normative and descriptive elements. If this were correct, it would help 
to explain why Hume is so comfortable with the idea that different epistemic standards (that 
of the vulgar and that of the wise) can be derived from human nature, whilst at the same 
time suggesting that human nature points to one of these standards (the reflective standard 
of the wise and of true philosophy) as being superior to the others. It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to develop this point in detail. However, it is worth noting that ‘natural’ does not 
always equate with ‘non-normative’ in Hume’s writings. When, in Book III of the Treatise, 
Hume divides virtues into ‘artificial and ‘natural’ ones, he is not thereby suggesting that 
artificial virtues are normative whereas natural ones are not: both types of virtue are, of 
course, normative for Hume. We would do well, I think, to re-evaluate Hume’s conception 
of human nature and of what counts as natural; this might prove crucial in furthering our 
understanding of his approach to epistemic justification.
I would like to end this paper by citing two passages – one from the Treatise, the other 
from the Enquiry – that, to my mind, allude to this normative, regulatory aspect of the con-
cept of human nature. If nothing else, these passages point the way for further exploration. 
No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we 
commonly call CREDULITY, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others; and this 
weakness is also very naturally accounted for from the influence of resemblance. 
When we receive any matter of fact upon human testimony, our faith arises from the 
very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from effects to causes; 
nor is there anything but our experience of the governing principles of human nature, 
which can give us any assurance of the veracity of men. But tho’ experience be the 
true standard of this, as well as of all other judgments, we seldom regulate ourselves 
entirely by it; but have a remarkable propensity to believe whatever is reported, even 
concerning apparitions, enchantments, and prodigies, however contrary to daily expe-
rience and observation. (Italics added. Treatise I.iii.9)
Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nour-
ishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can 
be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is 
a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: but neither can he always enjoy company agree-
able and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being; and 
from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to 
business and occupation: but the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always support 
its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life 
as most suitable to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these 
biases to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. 
Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may 
have a direct reference to action and society. (Italics added. EHU sec. I)
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